become institutionalized as intermediation practice. Such accountability innovation, aimed at providing additional checks within the RIT system, may be particularly important in settings where targets are strongly motivated to resist implementation.
To explore this conjecture, I examine a new generation of human rights treaty innovation: the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). 2 Both instruments take a turn toward more intrusive governance architecture via intermediation, reflecting the limited capacity of human rights regulators (UN treaties and their state parties) to effectively bring pressure to bear on targets (individual states). Both also provide compelling examples of RIT regulation, with viable sites of regulatory stewardship apparent among international and nationally located intermediaries.
State parties to human rights conventions are typically obliged to recognize the monitoring jurisdiction of a Geneva-based UN treaty body, comprising independent experts.
In the CRPD, this body is the Committee for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The OPCAT directs state parties to recognize the jurisdiction of a Subcommittee for the Prevention of Torture (SPT). As explained below, these international intermediaries are good candidates for exercising regulatory stewardship toward national mechanisms, which the conventions obligate individual state parties to establish. The CRPD prescribes the designation of "one or more focal points" and a "national framework" as legal obligations, and also directs states to consider establishing an optional "coordination mechanism." 3 Parties to the OPCAT must designate a "national preventive mechanism" (NPM). 4 These national intermediaries may in turn pursue a regulatory stewardship policy.
Not all intermediaries in these two RIT systems are independent of government. The CRPD focal point and the (voluntary) coordination mechanism are governmental bodies, mandated to oversee implementation within the public administration of the state party. In contrast, the CRPD national framework, subsequently termed the national monitoring mechanism (NMM), must include "one or more independent [from government] mechanisms," tasked with the "promotion, protection and monitoring" of implementation. 5 The CRPD NMM is the closest analogue to the OPCAT's NPM, which similarly must be guaranteed "functional independence" from government. Both instruments also explicitly reference independent safeguards ("the Paris Principles") for the design of national human rights institutions (NHRIs). 6 Reflecting this standard, the majority of these bodies are NHRIs: statutory bodies appointed by the legislature, independent of the executive, and undertaking their mandate without instruction (Pegram 2015) .
The premium placed on the independence of this class of national-level intermediaries is complicated by the nature of their designation. The regulator in the CRPD and OPCAT authorizes the intermediaries' role and requires targets to accept their regulatory jurisdiction.
However, and crucially, both instruments provide that each state may individually designate its own national intermediaries, as opposed to designation by the regulator or another external party. In contexts where the target is strongly motivated to resist implementation, this introduces a high risk that the intermediary will lack independence from the target and/or the requisite operational capacity. Anticipating this risk, the regulator may also adopt safeguards that make capture difficult for the target, including rules that mandate or encourage intermediaries to independently monitor each other's behavior: regulatory stewardship.
To investigate what makes for effective stewardship, this study identifies three key dimensions, along which the CRPD and OPCAT vary significantly: First, the characteristics of the task environment, in particular, the extent to which the target is motivated to resist implementation. Second, the enabling quality of formal rule frameworks, especially the extent to which they provide intermediaries (as potential stewards) independence safeguards, as well as mutual-monitoring and support prerogatives. Third, the policy approaches that potential stewards pursue in practice. The findings of this article have clear implications for the quality of regulatory outcomes in other fields, such as environment, transnational business, and health, which also typically display multiple intermediaries and where implementation of policy directives often proves problematic.
I begin by applying the RIT model to the CRPD and OPCAT. It then introduces the concept of regulatory stewardship. This is followed by an examination of variation in task environments between disability rights and torture prevention. The study then analyzes the enabling design features granted to the international intermediaries established by these two instruments, with particular attention to monitoring and support, before assessing their approach toward stewardship in practice. The conclusion examines the implications of regulatory stewardship for the RIT model and regulatory politics more generally.
An RIT Model of Human Rights Treaty Innovation
The UN human rights regime plays a central role in agenda-setting and negotiation of human rights treaties. It also undertakes the hierarchical task of monitoring human rights treaty implementation. Notwithstanding progress on this front, a persistent compliance gap has led to sharp criticism. The compliance challenge underpins longstanding efforts by regulators to engage intermediaries in their activities. This has traditionally taken the form of international monitoring mechanisms. However, recent treaty innovations mark a significant departure from precedent. The OPCAT and the CRPD oblige state parties to recognize the monitoring prerogatives of not only international treaty bodies, but also domestic monitoring and implementation mechanisms.
Both instruments are unique within the international treaty system in that they require a national mechanism to be established, as a matter of international legal obligation. Figure 1 illustrates this new generation of RIT architecture, highlighting the shift from a traditional model of international monitoring to a two-tier monitoring arrangement.
FIGURE 1

RIT Arrangement in the CRPD and OPCAT
The regulator
The regulator in this domain is the collective of state parties acting through the relevant UN treaty, the CRPD, and OPCAT respectively. It is important to note that the regulator in each instrument delegates to individual states (the targets) the task of appointing independent experts to the international monitoring mechanism, as well as designating the national The OPCAT is the more intrusive instrument of the two, establishing an international intermediary, the SPT, which is unique among treaty bodies because it has the authority to conduct field visits to arrive at its own independent assessment of state compliance. 8 As this article details, the ability of the SPT to directly access local sites of detention without prior authorization from governments, coupled with a range of formal monitoring and support functions vis-à-vis national intermediaries, provides it with a robust basis on which to pursue regulatory stewardship in practice.
In the CPRD, monitoring duties at the international level are entrusted to the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The committee follows the traditional human rights treaty body model. It is mandated to review state reports, assess information from third parties, and issue general comments. The most significant difference between the committee and the SPT lies in the former's inability to conduct field visits-the committee is reliant on state selfreporting. 9 The committee, like most treaty bodies, will review each state party every six to eight years, at most. As such, monitoring and implementation activities by national mechanisms assume particular importance.
The domestic intermediary
The OPCAT and CRPD introduce a new tier of domestic intermediaries into the traditional treaty law paradigm, with the regulator formally delegating functions to domestic mechanisms. OPCAT National Preventive Mechanisms (NPM) are intended to "regularly examine the treatment of the persons deprived of their liberty in places of detention." 10 The CRPD provides for two obligatory national mechanisms: "one or more focal points within government for matters relating to implementation" and "a framework, including one or more independent mechanisms … to promote, protect and monitor implementation." 11 It also includes an optional "coordination mechanism within government to facilitate related action in different sectors." Notably, the CRPD brings in beneficiaries as active participants, with state parties directed to ensure that disabled persons' organizations (DPOs) are "involved and participate fully in the monitoring process" (Koenig-Archibugi and MacDonald, this volume).
The OPCAT relies on the NPM to engage persons deprived of their liberty. This precision contrasts with the brevity of the CRPD on design of the independent NMM: it prescribes no specific organizational form beyond reference to "one or more independent mechanisms." State parties are instead directed "to take into account" the Paris Principles. The convention is, however, unusually detailed on state obligations related to implementation activities, also reflected in the embedding of the focal point and coordination mechanism within government itself. However, they will typically require special supervision to avoid conflicts of interest given their proximity to the target. This qualification applies to any intermediary that is the recipient of significant resources from the target.
Regulatory stewardship can be formal and an actor's core function, but it can also be informal and one of many roles that an actor plays, alongside rule-developer, monitor, or Working under a formal mandate is likely to magnify the impact of a steward, and to elicit cooperation from other intermediaries. However, acceptance of a steward's role by other stakeholders may be sufficient for this innovation to take hold, potentially triggering emulation of stewardship practices more widely. Regardless of whether stewardship is formally regulated or informal, the intermediary should take responsibility for the integrity of the entire regulatory system, to the extent that it can. An intermediary might be a more effective steward if it has express authorization, but all intermediaries should be expected to undertake this task, using whatever authority they possess. Given that some intermediaries may have their own goals and be reluctant to assume this function, whoever creates them should consider mandating the stewardship function, as well as providing potential stewards with the appropriate authority.
Stewards may use both hierarchical and managerial techniques to monitor and support other intermediaries. As developed further below, their choice will depend in part on the task environments that they encounter. Two strands of explanation, managerial and instrumental, can be identified in the scholarship on compliance. Prominent managerial accounts argue for noncoercive strategies to support targets that genuinely wish to comply but find that they cannot (Chayes and Chayes 1993). Conversely, instrumental explanations highlight compliance problems inherent to regulatory contexts defined by strong distributive and value conflicts, above all resistance by the target to implementation (Posner 2010 ). Such adverse settings will require harder enforcement mechanisms. Applying these two logics to stewardship, intermediaries operating in contested regulatory terrain may be particularly vulnerable to capture and/or under-performance, requiring stewards to employ harder hierarchical techniques to steer behavior. Conversely, where intermediaries operate in relatively cooperative regulatory settings, but find that they cannot fulfill their functions due to low capacity or insufficient authority, stewards may adopt a mutual-support approach.
Mutual monitoring is the primary task of the steward, through police patrol or watchdog procedures, supervision and even sanctions. Stewards typically focus on monitoring other intermediaries' mandates, independence, capacity, routines, and operating procedures as they develop over time. However, stewardship can also be extended to monitoring the creation of intermediaries yet to be established, whether the creator is a target, beneficiary, regulator, or any other actor with a view to facilitate subsequent stewardship activities. The second aspect of stewardship is mutual support. Managerial stewardship might involve promoting voluntary adherence through training, technical assistance, fostering dialogue, and capacity-building.
Where an intermediary is structured appropriately and undertaking significant efforts to fulfill its function-even if falling short of optimal performance-stewards can support and assist it so as to make the overall regulatory system stronger. The hierarchical and managerial logics of action are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they may be complementary. Astute stewardship will require deploying a mix of regulatory instruments, responsive to changing circumstances and managing relationships on which the long-term success of the regime depends.
The techniques a steward employs to influence an intermediary also depend on the powers that it is granted. In turn, a steward might have higher capacity to influence some intermediaries more than others. For example, stewards may establish transnational networks, and even accreditation systems, to promote a stewardship system among peer agencies.
Capacity is likely to be a function of enabling rules including mandates, direct access to other intermediaries, expertise and organizational resources, and legitimacy. Regulatory stewardship does not make any assumptions regarding intermediary capacities to advance its goals.
Lobbying skills may provide an important additional resource.
The CRPD and OPCAT provide fertile terrain to explore the application of regulatory (2) the enabling quality of formal rules, especially the extent to which they provide intermediaries (as potential stewards) independence safeguards, mutual-monitoring, and support prerogatives; and (3) the policy approaches potential stewards apply in practice.
Drawing Out the Contrast: Human Rights as Regulatory Task Environments
Intermediaries operating in regulatory settings where the target is motivated to resist implementation may be subject to strong incentives to modify their own practices to benefit the target (T captures I) or otherwise be rendered ineffectual (T immobilizes I). Conversely, even in settings where the target genuinely wishes to comply, an intermediary may find that low capacity or insufficient administrative authority undermines its performance. As such, the compliance problem varies depending on the goal alignment between the regulator and the target, the degree to which the target exercises influence over the intermediary, and the capacity of intermediaries to discharge their function. Stewards seeking to influence other intermediaries should be attentive to this underlying task environment and tailor their use of hierarchical and managerial strategies accordingly.
Human rights governance presents a particularly challenging task environment for "what matters is not the issue-area, but the strategic environment underlying a particular problem." Notably, such variation differentiates disability rights from torture prevention.
In general terms, the disability rights environment is more one of cooperation than of compliance (Chayes and Chayes 1993) . A cooperative task environment underpins de Búrca's (2015) modeling of the CRPD as emblematic of experimentalist human rights governance. The unprecedented speed of negotiation and ratification of the instrument also aligns with a logic of cooperation. 15 The CPRD seeks to benefit vulnerable groups that already enjoy significant legal protections, is generally situated in low visibility (and low status) policy domains such as social welfare, and often implicates the state in violations resulting from omission or neglect, as opposed to criminal or egregious actions.
One implication of a cooperative regulatory setting is that the hierarchical stewardship imperative recedes and more weight is placed on the secondary task: mutual support. A managerial logic is implicit in the embedding of the CRPD focal point and coordination mechanism within government, directed to coordinate activities across government and facilitate cooperative solutions. As one CRPD expert puts it: "States know what's wrong, they need solutions, they need people to actually contrive blueprints for change." 16 However, the task of monitoring remains important, particularly given the proximity of intermediaries to the target, coupled with resistance to ambitious elements of the CRPD that call for major social reform and budget allocations. Recent government pushback against controversial opinions of the CRPD committee is indicative of such resistance. 17 Monitoring the NMM to ensure it is effectively monitoring these processes therefore remains a pressing concern.
In contrast to the CRPD, the OPCAT is more a realm of compliance than of cooperation form and function were the subjects of heated disagreements. 18 Fourteen years since adoption, OPCAT has only eighty state parties and eighteen signatories. OPCAT seeks to protect beneficiaries often labeled as "undeserving," which intrudes into core domains such as security, and may implicate state officials in egregious, sometimes criminal, behavior (Holmes 2013 ). Expert observers draw out the contrast:
Everybody wants to be seen to be promoting the rights of persons with disabilities. It's a sort of good cause everyone can get behind; you're a good champion, whereas nobody wants to be seen to be fighting torture, because by doing so you admit that torture exists. In that equation, there is the recognition that we have a problem with torture. Nobody wants to admit to having that problem, and that's where the difficulty lies. 19 The narrow regulatory objective of OPCAT, to gain effective access to all places of detention, also provokes strong sovereignty concerns. The Australian Parliament declared in 2009 that there was "no immediate need" for Australia to ratify the OPCAT, objecting to the fact that the instrument would constitute a standing invitation to the SPT. 20 Hard-nosed monitoring by regulatory stewards in this domain, including police patrol, watchdog procedures, and supervision, is likely to be necessary to guard against intermediary capture and poor performance. OPCAT practitioners are keen to contrast the protocol's preventive paradigm (identifying risk factors and then making recommendations) with an accountability paradigm (holding people to account). Scope does exist for more managerial strategies of influence. However, practitioners also concede that "challenging [government officials] and holding them to account is high risk." 21 In adverse regulatory settings, express authorizations or enabling rules are likely to provide an important resource for empowering potential stewards.
Regulatory Stewardship by Design
require mutual monitoring and support among intermediaries. Alternatively, an authorizing actor may adopt enabling rules, or an intermediary may pursue a stewardship policy without any formal authorization. Neither the CRPD nor OPCAT expressly authorizes the SPT and CRPD committee to undertake regulatory stewardship. However, both instruments contain, to varying degrees, rules that can enable stewardship in practice. These include rules related to mandate, access, expertise, organizational autonomy, and independence.
A stewardship function is most clearly imprinted in the design of the SPT. Mutual monitoring prerogatives can be inferred from the SPT mandate to undertake three core tasks:
(1) conduct country visits in places of deprivation of liberty, (2) coordinate the work of NPMs, and (3) cooperate with other UN and regional organizations. This triadic function provides a robust basis for elaborating a stewardship role. However, the overarching mission of the SPT remains coordination of a global inspection system of detention facilities.
Notably, the SPT is also granted an express mandate to advise on NPM establishment.
The subcommittee is further directed to maintain direct (and, if necessary, confidential) contact with NPMs. Governments are also obliged to guarantee NPMs direct access to the SPT. On the secondary task of mutual support, the SPT is instructed to offer training and technical assistance to enhance NPM capacity, and to advise and assist on protection activities. The OPCAT also provides for a fund to support SPT capacity-building of NPMs. 22 OPCAT rules regarding SPT-NPM engagement are supplemented by the SPT's "rules of procedure," which it establishes itself.
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In the event of noncooperation by the target or intermediary, the SPT can deploy a limited range of formal sanctions, which include releasing critical preliminary findings and making public statements. 24 Finally, while SPT independence safeguards are more robust than other treaty bodies, SPT members are not subject to any external form of accountability, beyond periodic reelection. The OPCAT sets down detailed independence, impartiality, and expertise criteria for committee membership. 25 However, there is no prohibition on SPT members working for governments simultaneously. Stewardship activities by other intermediaries, including NPMs and civil society organizations, are important to ensure that these independence shortcomings do not jeopardize the legitimacy of the SPT. 26 The CRPD displays a less-enabling stewardship framework, especially in terms of monitoring prerogatives. It has no provision for a subcommittee, with legal interpretation and monitoring duties entrusted to a Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
Following the traditional treaty body paradigm, the committee is restricted to an indirect form of watchdog oversight. Committee discretion to engage independent monitors can be inferred from the reporting obligations of state parties. Another point of interaction may come under the convention's optional protocol, which includes an individual complaints procedure and provision for country visits (with state-party consent).
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The CRPD committee is not guaranteed direct access to national mechanisms.
However, neither is it proscribed from engaging with them as a matter of institutional practice, and importantly, like the SPT, it can "establish its own rules of procedure." 28 Article 37
provides a general directive that the committee "give due consideration to ways and means of enhancing national capacities," which provides scope for elaborating a stewardship function. In effect, the CRPD provides less scope for the subcommittee to exercise a fully fledged regulatory stewardship function. Nevertheless, the convention does provide some limited scope for it to pursue a policy of stewardship. As the next section elaborates, compliance problems have provided a motive for the committee to (reluctantly) assume a regulatory stewardship role.
Regulatory Stewardship in Practice
Rules are not self-activating. Their scope of application hinges in large part on motivated actors invoking them as a basis for action. Regulatory stewardship is not expressly authorized in either the OPCAT or CRPD. However, the SPT and CRPD committee operate under a range of enabling rules that make stewardship a viable policy option. This section surveys policies adopted by both bodies in practice, with attention to the primary task of mutual monitoring, monitoring the creation of intermediaries, and the secondary component of mutual support.
OPCAT regulatory stewardship
Although the work of the SPT is conducted in a "spirit of cooperation," the SPT has recognized that unless "the NPM are able to fulfil their role … the work of the [s]ubcommittee will be seriously limited and adversely affected. Although visits are typically framed in terms of advice and assistance to NPMs, they also provide opportunities to police intermediary independence. This has led the subcommittee to issue critical statements on NPM independence, addressing issues of NPM membership, 32 the lack of civil society participation, 33 inappropriate placement of NPMs within state structures, 34 and budget allocations compromising the autonomy of the office. 35 The SPT has engaged state officials directly to strengthen NPM independence. 36 As one expert puts it, the SPT "is like an international cousin to the national mechanisms, [they] can protect them with a more extended field of influence and prestige in the UN." 37 They also typically encourage NPMs themselves to "take steps to back up the efforts made on [their] behalf by the
[s]ubcommittee." 38 NPMs must also follow up on SPT visit reports, with delays in doing so monitored by the subcommittee. 39 The capacity of the SPT to engage in NPM monitoring is in part a function of resources, which is a constant source of concern. However, it also has much to do with an enabling rule framework. As the SPT chair puts it:
The power of a legal mandate is more than some people think, we have been able to do things which they [state parties] absolutely don't want us to do, but then they can see that we mean business and that we've got the legal mandate on our side. 40 Country visits, coupled with guarantees of direct and confidential contact with NPMs,
give the SPT a significant informational advantage in independently assessing NPM performance. The subcommittee has not shied away from criticizing NPMs that are manifestly failing in their duties. 41 Although the SPT is unable to compel intermediaries, it can issue formal public statements and can utilize "all possible good offices within the United Nations system and any other appropriate forums." 42 It has used publicity and press statements to criticize governments where political support for NPM is lacking. 43 SPT stewardship activities have also been extended to monitoring the creation of intermediaries yet to be established. Experts note that "the space between ratification and NPM designation must be monitored very closely by everyone." 44 The SPT website hosts information on established NPMs and pending designations. 45 Of seventy-nine state parties that have ratified the OPCAT, fifty-five have designated an NPM. In the face of official resistance, the SPT has successfully requested access to drafts of NPM legislation. 46 The SPT has not been shy in challenging state parties that fail to abide by NPM design safeguards. 47 The SPT may also work with existing domestic agencies. In Peru, a robustly independent NHRI was designated the NPM in December 2015, nine years after OPCAT ratification and in the face of significant government hostility. 48 In this case, sustained NGO and NHRI advocacy, coupled with an SPT country visit in 2013, were important. Such episodes indicate the compliance problems that plague this domain.
In assessing NPM form, the SPT endorses the Paris Principles, which provide a standard on which to assess NHRI design conformity. The peer-network Global Alliance of NHRIs (GANHRI) undertakes a letter-grade accreditation system ("A" status indicating full compliance) within the UN system. 49 However, the principles have some drawbacks, which have led the SPT to resist deferral to GANHRI accreditation. First, as Reif (2015) points out, accreditation may exclude independent institutions that effectively protect human rights, but do not comply with all aspects of the principles. Second, it risks reducing assessment of NPMs to a tick box exercise. The subcommittee has stated that the formal suitability of a NHRI for the NPM role must be assessed on a country-by-country basis.
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SPT experts are even more wary of using the GANHRI letter grade system for a purpose for which it was not intended: monitoring NPM performance. This reflects a distinct approach toward the mutual support aspect of regulatory stewardship. The SPT does regularly employ managerial strategies to influence NPM performance. In the words of the SPT chair:
If it turns out that they're [the NPM] not independent or they're not functioning as they ought, then rather than just label them as bad or not very good, our role is to talk to the NPM, to understand its practice, find out what the problems are, and try to get it to work better.
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Geneva-based engagement with NPMs is important in this respect, including informal dialogues, exchange of information, and regular meetings under the aegis of the OPCAT contact group. This also allows NPMs to exercise mutual regulatory stewardship. Notably, some members of the SPT are former NPM functionaries. However, particular emphasis is placed on advice, assistance, and training to NPMs in the field. SPT visits often involve joint missions to places of detention, training, and capacity-building. These activities typically result in corrective strategic advice. 52 The subcommittee also regularly advises NPMs on questions of law and its adaptation to local conditions. 53 
CRPD regulatory stewardship
Although the CRPD grants the committee some stewardship prerogatives, since references to the focal point or coordination mechanism. 55 In more recent observations, the committee has generally lamented the lack of designation of such bodies. 56 Exceptions include observations on Hong Kong (China), which express worry at "the low rank of the focal point." 57 Observations on Slovakia refer briefly to the limited capacity of the focal points and coordination mechanism. 58 Given the emphasis of the CRPD on implementation and the committee's inability to conduct field visits, the lack of rigorous monitoring of independence and performance of national intermediaries is perhaps surprising. However, underlying this deficit is the difficulty the committee confronts in obtaining access to information, given its reliance on third parties and its lack of visitation powers. As one observer notes, given these limitations, "it is easier to make recommendations when there is no structure or when you know that the structure is governmental." 59 This is reflected in various concluding observations. For example, the committee notes that the so-called Independent Monitoring Committee in Austria "appears to lacks the independence required." 60 Similarly, concluding observations on Serbia express concern about the lack of information on the composition of the NMM. 61 This informational disadvantage has also impeded the committee's ability to undertake monitoring of intermediary performance. CRPD experts underscore the importance of "a strong independent analogue to the implementation role of government" (Quinn 2008 The committee has no formal mandate to advise on intermediary establishment.
However, a survey of designation outcomes in Europe suggests that the committee could make greater use of its reporting procedure to do so. Of thirty-two countries, twenty-one have designated their NMMs. Some of these mechanisms clearly do not comply, including Italy where the Minister of Labor and Social Policy chairs the independent mechanism. 64 This is attributed largely to confusion among governments as to the obligations arising from Article 33. 65 In response, the committee has begun to advise on NMM creation. Notably, its 2015 report on the Czech Republic is the first to explicitly recommend that a particular entity be designated as the NMM. 66 However, observations on yet-to-be-established intermediaries are generally short, nonspecific and, in contrast to the SPT, reliant on the Paris Principles.
The committee has also not taken advantage of its mandate to actively pursue a managerial policy of mutual support. In surveying best practice on UN treaty body engagement with national mechanisms, the committee conspicuously omits the SPT from its 2016 draft guidelines. Instead, interaction centers on Geneva-based modalities: NMM participation in the committee's general reporting procedure, working group presessions, and dialogue between the committee and the state party. These modalities of treaty body engagement fall short of direct intermediary support. For many observers, an exclusively Geneva-based engagement policy is problematic. Distant from the realities of human rights violations, they argue that it is also difficult for national mechanisms to justify the resource demands of international participation.
The committee does have tools at its disposal to actively assist NMMs within local jurisdictions. The committee has recently acknowledged its "role as a capacity-building agent under article 37." 67 But it defers to NHRIs and NMMs for this function. The committee recognizes that CRPD implementation will require "collective, coordinated and continuous efforts" by diverse actors but is reluctant to take a lead on coordination itself. 68 That said, the committee has recently stated its intention to explore the possibility of working more closely with national intermediaries on developing core indicators and supporting their activities. 69 This could lay the groundwork for more active regulatory stewardship in practice.
Conclusion
The RIT framework provides scholars an opportunity to examine regulatory regimes involving intermediation that highlight significant reform and bely prominent claims of gridlock (Hale, Held, and Young 2013). This study has illuminated a new generation of formalized intermediary-centered human rights treaty innovation that builds on longstanding efforts to orchestrate informal action through third parties (Pegram 2015) . Separating out the intermediary from the rule-maker and the rule-taker is a necessary addition to accounts of an evolving UN system (de Búrca 2015), and highlights new intrusive channels for affecting the behavior of regulatory targets.
The OPCAT and CRPD introduce a novel formalization of engagement between and among international and national intermediaries. The imprinting of national intermediary form and function within binding treaty law represents a paradigm shift in the human rights field.
This article finds that the RIT model maps relatively straightforwardly onto these two instruments, with the crucial qualification that in this domain it is the target that appoints the formal intermediaries. This, of course, introduces a high risk of capture and shows how the RIT framework can foreground intermediation as an alternative channel for regulatory capture.
This study has advanced regulatory stewardship as a novel solution to this policy dilemma, especially where targets are strongly motivated to resist implementation.
Focusing on the experience of international intermediaries established by these two instruments, the study has probed three factors posited as influencing effective regulatory stewardship: (1) the nature of the task environment; (2) the enabling quality of rule frameworks; and (3) the approaches adopted by potential stewards in practice. The findings here support this three-fold explanation, with SPT policy entrepreneurs drawing on a more robust enabling rule framework to exercise effective regulatory stewardship in practice, despite confronting an adverse task environment.
Additional factors also emerge as central to the study; in particular, access assumes particular significance. The SPT scores highly on this dimension. Its ability to access local jurisdictions without state party consent, combined with guaranteed access to national intermediaries, has proven to be a significant resource. More broadly, the study suggests that 
